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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to find a way to undermine the indispensability argument for mathematical  
platonism. In chapter 1 I provide a brief survey of the indispensability argument, arguing that the 
explanatory indispensability  argument  is  stronger  than  earlier  forms  of  the  argument.  This  is  
because it has less controversial premises,  appealing neither to confirmational holism nor to a 
strong naturalism but rather to inference to the best explanation, a principle of inference which  
both  sides  in  the  indispensability  debate  are  taken  to  accept.  Hence  I  take  the  explanatory 
indispensability argument as my target.
In chapter 2, I provide a more detailed account of the way in which inference to the best  
explanation,  or  IBE,  is  involved  in  the  explanatory  indispensability  argument.  I  present  two 
readings of the argument,  rejecting the first  reading and arguing that  a second reading,  which 
involves an instance of IBE, is the most plausible.
Chapter  3  considers  whether  there  are  genuine  cases  of  mathematical  explanation  in 
science, focusing on an explanation from evolutionary biology provided by Alan Baker. I draw on 
the biological literature to argue that there is some reason to doubt that Baker's explanation meets  
the conditions for a successful application of IBE.
In  chapter  4  I  examine  a  number  of  restrictions  on  IBE  recently  suggested  in  the 
indispensability debate. Firstly, I argue that the indexing account suggests a reasonable restriction 
on IBE, but that proponents of the indexing account have not yet shown that this restriction is  
successful  in  undermining  the  explanatory  indispensability  argument.  Secondly,  I  examine  a 
restriction  on  IBE  proposed  by  Pincock,  arguing  that  this  restriction  is  also  unsuccessful  in  
blocking the support of mathematical claims through IBE. Thirdly, I propose a restriction on IBE 
motivated  by  scientific  practice  and  which,  I  argue,  successfully  undermines  the  explanatory 
indispensability argument.
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Introduction
In this thesis,  I search for a way to undermine the indispensability argument for mathematical  
platonism, a philosophical position which holds that there are abstract mathematical objects. The 
main opponent of the indispensability argument is the nominalist, who claims that there are no 
mathematical  objects.  Although  I  aim to  undermine  an  important  argument  for  mathematical 
platonism,  my  thesis  does  not  serve  as  an  argument  for  nominalism,  since  platonism  and 
nominalism could both be incorrect.
Since my aim is to undermine the indispensability argument, it will be advantageous first  
to  locate  a  strong  form of  the  indispensability  argument,  by which  I  mean  a  version  of  the 
indispensability argument with the fewest and least controversial premises, so that my arguments  
will have maximum effect. 
In chapter 1 I provide a brief survey of the indispensability argument, which allows me to 
locate a form of the argument known as the explanatory indispensability argument, which does not 
appeal to confirmational holism or to a strong reading of naturalism. Since these premises are  
controversial, an argument that does without these premises is more difficult to undermine. The 
explanatory  indispensability  argument  involves  an  implicit  appeal  to  inference  to  the  best 
explanation,  a principle of inference which both sides in the indispensability debate are taken to 
accept.  This  suggests  that  the  explanatory  indispensability  argument  will  be  difficult  for  the 
nominalist to undermine. I will thus have located a version of the indispensability argument which 
is particularly difficult to undermine, and which I will take as my target in the rest of the thesis.  
Since the explanatory indispensability argument is the subject of much recent discussion in the 
literature, my thesis also functions as a survey of recent attempts to undermine the explanatory 
indispensability argument.
In chapter 2, I will clarify the way in which inference to the best explanation, or IBE, is  
involved in the explanatory indispensability argument. In most formulations of the explanatory 
indispensability argument  the  appeal  to  IBE is  implicit.  However,  since  inference  to  the  best  
explanation  is  taken  to  be  central  in  the  recent  indispensability  debate,  it  will  be  useful  to  
understand the role played by IBE in the explanatory indispensability argument in more detail.  
Therefore I will first provide a basic account of inference to the best explanation.
Then, I will  examine an application of IBE in the No Miracles argument for scientific 
realism.  Platonists  sometimes  appeal  to  scientific  realism  in  support  of  the  explanatory 
indispensability argument, because, as I will argue, accepting scientific realism involves endorsing 
inference to the best explanation. However, the talk of scientific realism is often misleading and I 
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will  argue  that  it  is  best  dropped.  Hence  I  will  motivate  a  version  of  the  explanatory 
indispensability argument which does not rely on scientific realism, but involves an instance of  
inference to the best explanation. According to this argument, the existence of a mathematical  
explanation in science motivates the claim that we ought rationally to believe in the existence of  
mathematical entities.
In chapter  3,  therefore,  I  examine  an example of  mathematical  explanation in  science 
drawn  from  evolutionary  biology.  This  example,  provided  by  Alan  Baker,  has  been  widely 
discussed  in  the  recent  literature.  I  will  argue  that  any attempts  to  show that  Baker  has  not 
provided a genuine case of mathematical explanation in science must be made on a scientific basis, 
and, for this reason, I will argue that various nominalistically acceptable alternatives fail. I will 
appeal to the biological literature to argue that there is some evidence for a lack of consensus on  
Baker's  explanation  amongst  biologists,  which  suggests  that  Baker's  example  needs  further 
scientific defence.
Nevertheless, since further examples of mathematical explanation in science have been 
provided in  science,  and I  wish to  avoid a case-by-case study of  mathematical  application in 
science,  I  will  seek  a  more  general  strategy of  undermining  the  explanatory  indispensability 
argument. In chapter 4, I examine three restrictions on IBE, proposed in order to block the instance  
of IBE that is involved in the explanatory indispensability argument.
First,  I  will  consider  the  indexing account,  which,  I  will  argue,  involves  a reasonable 
restriction on IBE. However, I will argue that proponents of the indexing account have not yet 
shown that this restriction blocks the support of mathematical claims via IBE. I then examine a  
second restriction proposed by Pincock, which I will argue is also unsuccessful. Finally, I propose 
a restriction on IBE which is motivated by scientific practice, and which, I argue, is successful in 
blocking the instance of IBE involved in the explanatory indispensability argument.  Therefore, I 
can claim to have succeeded in my aim to undermine the explanatory indispensability argument.
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Chapter 1: Indispensability arguments for mathematical platonism
Introduction
In  this  chapter,  I  will  give  a  basic  account  of  indispensability  arguments  for  mathematical 
platonism. I will look at the premises of such arguments and examine which of these premises are 
required for the argument to go through. My aim is to find a strong version of the indispensability 
argument, meaning a version which is difficult to undermine.  In general, since less controversial 
premises help to make an argument stronger than controversial premises, I aim to isolate a form of  
indispensability argument with the fewest and least controversial premises. The idea is for each 
premise to be as 'weak' as possible, in the sense that the premise claims no more than it must for  
the argument to go through.
In section 1.1 I will present a basic form of indispensability argument for mathematical  
platonism in order to introduce the players  in the debate.  In  this form,  the  argument  has two  
premises: one indispensability claim and one 'naturalist' claim about belief in science. In section 
1.2,  I  argue  that  the  indispensability  premise  cannot  be  weakened,  since  dropping  the 
indispensability requirement  leaves  the  argument  invalid.  I  then  discuss  the  second,  naturalist  
premise in section 1.3, and argue following Dieveney that on a sufficiently strong reading of this  
premise, a third premise of confirmational holism often taken to be implicit in the argument is  
superfluous, even in response to a separation objection.
Since I want to avoid strong, or controversial, premises, I then examine in section 1.4 an 
enhanced form of indispensability argument due to Baker that does without either confirmational 
holism  or  strong  naturalism,  while  still  answering  the  separation  objection.  This  'enhanced 
indispensability  argument'  focuses  on  the  explanatory  role  of  mathematics  in  science,  and 
following Busch I argue that this enhanced version is essentially an appeal to inference to the best 
explanation (IBE). 
The 'IBE version' of the indispensability argument has two premises, an indispensability 
premise as before and a premise which reads as an endorsement of IBE. In section 1.5 I argue that  
the indispensability premise cannot be weakened, and note that the 'IBE premise' seems at first 
sight to be granted by both sides in the debate. Since both premises will be difficult to deny, I can 
claim to have found a strong form of the indispensability argument, which will be my target in the 
rest of the thesis.
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1.1: Setting up the debate
The debate surrounding indispensability arguments in the literature takes place between platonists 
and nominalists. I will take platonism, or mathematical realism, to be the view that there are (at 
least some) abstract mathematical objects. Nominalism, or anti-realism, is taken to label any view 
holding that there are no mathematical objects.
Platonism/realism: there are at least some abstract mathematical objects.
Nominalism/anti-realism: there are no mathematical objects.
Roughly speaking, indispensability arguments hold that quantification over mathematical 
objects is  indispensable to our best  scientific theories,  and,  claiming that  we should rationally 
believe  our  best  scientific  theories  to  be  true  or  approximately true,  conclude that  we  should 
rationally believe in the existence of mathematical objects1. That is:
i. (Indispensability) Quantification over mathematical objects is indispensable to our best scientific 
theories.
ii. (Naturalism) We ought rationally to believe our best scientific theories to be true.
iii. (Platonist conclusion) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathematical objects.
Accepting this conclusion would be inconsistent with the nominalist position.
Now, there is substantial variation in the positions held on each side of the debate. On the 
platonist side, philosophers range from advocating 'plenitudinous platonism', according to which 
all possible mathematical objects exist [Balaguer 1998], and more restrictive forms of platonism,  
for  example  claiming  only  that  enough  mathematical  objects  exist  to  make  most  of  our 
mathematical statements literally true [Baker 2003]. I will keep the platonist claim in its current  
weak  form so  that  most  platonists  agree  with  it,  allowing  the  discussion  to  have  maximum 
applicability. Additionally, it is best for an argument to claim only as much as it needs to in order 
to convince or defeat the opposition.
Within nominalism, accounts vary depending on the semantic claims which are added to 
the metaphysical thesis that there are no mathematical objects. Note that the metaphysical claim 
that there are no mathematical objects entails that mathematics, on a face-value reading, is false:  
this is because our mathematical statements seem to refer to mathematical objects, e.g. 'there are  
1 For example, Baker writes that '[the indispensability] argument claims that we ought rationally to believe in 
the existence of mathematical objects because we ought to believe our best available scientific theories, and 
quantification over mathematical objects is indispensable for science' [Baker 2005: 223].
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infinitely  many  prime  numbers'.  Some  nominalists  provide  an  alternative  semantics  for 
mathematics, for example claiming that our mathematical statements have a real content as well as 
a literal content, where the real content is the 'conventional' content of the statement and consists  
of a logical truth [Yablo 2002: 230]. Others accept the conclusion that mathematics is false, and  
hold  that  mathematical  objects  are  merely  useful  fictions  which  allow  mathematics  to  be  
empirically useful  without  being true [e.g.  Leng 2010].  For the purposes of this  thesis,  I  will  
simply consider  the  nominalist  position as  resisting  the  platonist  claim that  there  are  abstract  
mathematical objects. 
So far, though, I have not clarified what is meant by the term 'abstract object'. By 'abstract' 
I mean acausal and non-spatiotemporally located. Since I take it that most players in the debate  
agree that if mathematical objects were to exist,  they would be abstract2,  I will  often drop the 
'abstract' and simply write 'mathematical objects' from now on. 
Consider next the term 'object'. I do not want the claim that there are no mathematical  
objects to mean that there is nothing mathematical, since whatever the outcome of the debate I  
want to allow at least that there is a mathematical discipline, for example, and such things as  
mathematical textbooks. So 'object' cannot mean 'any kind of thing'. But equally I do not want the  
term to be too restrictive. Some philosophers use the term 'object' to contrast with 'property', for 
example – the textbooks may have the property of being mathematical without being mathematical  
objects – but it is unclear that the indispensability argument would be able to establish which, if 
either, of objects or properties exist. Indeed, the indispensability argument has been criticised for 
not characterising what mathematical objects would be like, if they exist. For example, Colyvan  
writes that 'the indispensability argument, on the face of it at least, does not tell us anything about 
either mathematical epistemology or the nature of mathematical entities' [Colyvan 2009: 5-6]. 
It  will  therefore  be  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis  to  attempt  to  characterise  what 
mathematical objects would be like, if the indispensability argument is successful in showing that  
they  exist.  In  general,  I  will  take  mathematical  objects  simply  to  be  those  things  that 
mathematicians and scientists refer to and quantify over when they make mathematical claims, if  
such objects exist3.
2 Leng, for example, a prominent nominalist, writes: 'while it is not inconceivable that a plausible account of 
mathematical objects that, for example, viewed them to be causally efficacious or spatiotemporally located 
may be defensible … I take it to be safe to assume that belief in mathematical objects amounts to belief in 
abstracta' [Leng 2010: 19].
3 See Juhl's paper 'On the Indispensability of the Distinctively Mathematical' for discussion of the question 
whether 'to be mathematical is simply to be the referent of a mathematical term', and a separation of 'the 
question whether abstracta in general exist from whether distinctively mathematical abstracta exist' [Juhl 
2012: 1].
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Now, among various arguments for platonism, the indispensability argument is often taken 
to  be one of  the  most  important:  Dieveney,  for  example,  states  that  it  ‘has  traditionally been 
considered the strongest argument for realism about mathematical objects’ [Dieveney 2007: 105], 
and  Colyvan  holds  that  mathematical  realists  of  his  persuasion  ‘think  that  indispensability 
arguments offer the only good reason for that realism’ [Colyvan 1998: 39]. Let us now examine the 
argument in more detail.
Premise i holds that 'Quantification over mathematical objects is indispensable to our best 
scientific theories'.  However,  it  would be best  not to make quantification the important  factor, 
since this excludes  reference to mathematical objects by singular terms, for example terms for 
ratios  or  functions4.  Therefore,  I  will  take  allusion  to mathematical  objects  to include  both 
quantification over and reference to mathematical objects by constant terms, function terms or  
other  singular  terms,  and  reformulate  premise i  to  read  as  follows:  'Allusion  to  mathematical 
objects is indispensable to our best scientific theories'.
I  will  take allusion to mathematical objects to be  indispensable to a theory,  T, iff T is 
scientifically better than any rival theory without allusion to mathematical objects5. Let us say that 
T1 is scientifically better than T2  iff  T1 is predictively superior to T2, i.e. T1  has greater accuracy 
and wider scope of predictions, or if T1 and T2 are predictively equal but T1 is superior with respect 
to other scientific features such as explanatory power. I will say more about premise i in the next 
section.
Premise ii, which holds that we should rationally believe our best scientific theories to be  
true, may be taken to advocate simply a ‘healthy respect for science, taken at face value’ [Colyvan 
2006: 3], or it may be formulated as part of a stronger view that ‘Science is our ultimate arbiter of 
truth  and  existence’ [Resnik  1995:  166].  The  latter  claim is  usually  made  against  a  Quinean 
backdrop of naturalism as a rejection of ‘first philosophy’, following ‘the recognition that it is  
within  science  itself,  and  not  in  some  prior  philosophy,  that  reality  is  to  be  identified  and 
described’ [Quine 1981: 21, quoted in Leng 2010: 20]. My project here is not to identify or defend 
a concept  of  naturalism as recognisably Quinean,  but  rather  to examine which reading of the  
premise is advisable for the platonist. I will examine various readings of premise ii in section 1.3. 
Now, note the implicit assumption in the indispensability argument that (belief in) the truth 
4 Thanks to Marcus Giaquinto for this point.
5 This roughly follows Colyvan's definition, although I consider rival theories rather than modifications:
An entity is dispensable to a theory iff the following two conditions hold: 
1. There exists a modification of the theory in question resulting in a second theory with exactly the same  
observational consequences as the first, in which the entity in question is neither mentioned nor  
predicted.
2. The second theory must be preferable to the first. [Colyvan 2001: 77].
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of  theories  that  quantify  over  mathematical  objects  entails  (belief  in)  the  existence  of  those 
mathematical objects.  An anti-platonist who disagrees with this literal reading of mathematical 
statements  could  resist  this  inference.  For  example,  a  philosopher  providing  an  alternative 
semantics for mathematical  claims,  such as  Yablo,  may deny that  the truth of  a mathematical  
statement  implies  the  existence of  objects  quantified over  in  that  statement  and thus  take the  
indispensability argument to have only a weaker conclusion, namely:
iii*. (Limited conclusion) We should rationally believe the mathematical statements contained in 
our best scientific theories to be true.
I will say more about such positions in chapter 2, but in general I will assume a literal reading of 
mathematical claims.
So, I take it that the indispensability argument has particular force against philosophers 
who accept a literal reading of our mathematical statements and simultaneously wish to resist the 
conclusion  that  there  are  mathematical  objects.  A proponent  of  this  view must  hold  that  our 
mathematical theories are literally false, so at this point the following question may arise: why try 
to  defend  such  an  account,  which  as  Balaguer  notes  'can  seem a  bit  crazy'  given  our  early 
acquaintance with apparent arithmetical truths like '2+2=4'? [Balaguer 2011: 2].
Note that truth is not the only factor in the intellectual value of a theory; as Leng suggests, 
'it is plausible that the acknowledged successes of a given practice might be down to something 
other than the truth of utterances made in the context of that practice' [Leng 2010: 26]. Theories  
can be instrumentally useful, for example, without being true (as Newtonian theory is in science, 
especially the law of gravity),  and it is not necessarily on the basis of truth that mathematical  
theories are chosen or discarded. 
Charles Fisher gives the example of Invariant Theory, a mathematical theory that in 1886 
was taken to be 'as necessary a part of mathematical knowledge as the differential and integral  
calculus' [Fisher: 146], and yet which is now 'a dead subject … the problems of Invariant Theory 
having become uninteresting' (though its results not changing in truth value) [ibid.: 151]. We see 
that a theory may be false but useful, or true but uninteresting or even useless, and hence that the  
intellectual value of a theory is not wholly determined by its truth value. So perhaps the claim that 
our mathematical theories are literally false is not as 'crazy' as it first seems.
More importantly, however, note that I will not be arguing for any nominalist account in 
this thesis, since undermining the platonist position does not entail that nominalism must be true 
rather than some other anti-platonist account. As formulated, platonism and nominalism can both 
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be false but not both true [Baker 2003: 51]. Rather, my aim is to find a way to undermine an 
argument which as Colyvan puts it  ‘is  a very powerful  and persuasive device for warding off  
nominalism’ [Colyvan  1998:  39].  If  I  do  manage  to  provide  strong  reasons  to  doubt  the  
indispensability argument, this will be a significant result for the nominalist.
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  find  a  strong  form  of  indispensability  argument  for  
mathematical platonism, where I take this to mean a form with the fewest and least controversial  
premises. In the next few sections, I examine which premises (including apparently implicit ones) 
can be weakened or dispensed with entirely.
1.2: Dispensability
In  this  section,  I  will  discuss  the  'indispensability  premise'  of  the  indispensability  argument, 
premise i, which claims that allusion to mathematical objects is indispensable to our best scientific 
theories. Is this premise as weak as possible, or could the premise be reformulated to do without  
the  indispensability  claim,  simply  holding  that  i*:  'our  best  scientific  theories  allude  to 
mathematical objects'? 
Recall that I took allusion to mathematical objects to be indispensable to a theory, T, iff T 
is  scientifically better  than  any rival  theory without  allusion  to  mathematical  objects.  To  see 
whether i* is sufficient, we must consider a situation, S, where i* holds and i does not. This is a  
situation where our  best  scientific theories  allude to mathematical  objects,  but  this  allusion is  
dispensable,  so  that  rival  scientific  theories  which  do  not  allude  to  mathematical  objects  are 
scientifically as good or better; in this case, as good. 
Now,  premise  ii,  which  claims  that  we  ought  rationally to  believe  our  best  scientific 
theories  to  be true,  gives  us  reason to  believe only our  best scientific  theories  to  be true.  In 
situation S, the rival theories with and without allusion to mathematical objects, respectively, are 
equally good. Premise ii does not tell us which of these rival theories to believe (we cannot believe 
both,  if  they  are  rivals).  In  situation  S,  therefore,  we  need  not  believe  in  the  existence  of 
mathematical objects. Therefore, premise i cannot be replaced by i*, and thus the indispensability 
claim is not dispensable.
Now, the indispensability premise is very hard to refute. Hartry Field attempts to show that 
quantification over mathematical objects is dispensable to at least one of our scientific theories by 
giving an account  of  Newtonian gravitational  theory without  quantification over  mathematical 
objects [Field 1980]. His account is very technical and has been disputed on various grounds; the 
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details  are  not  important  here,  since  my  aim  here  is  to  find  out  if  any  premises  of  the 
indispensability argument are superfluous and how much each premise must claim in order for the  
conclusion to go through. The indispensability premise, it turns out, cannot be weakened on my 
reading of indispensability.
1.3: Naturalism and confirmational holism
In the previous section, I examined the indispensability premise that gives the indispensability 
argument its name. I now turn my attention to the other premise, premise ii, which claims that we  
ought rationally to believe our best scientific theories to be true, as well as another premise of 
confirmational  holism,  which various  philosophers  claim to be implicit  in  the  indispensability 
argument [e.g. Maddy 1997 and Colyvan 2001, quoted in Dieveney: 109]. In this section I argue,  
following  Dieveney,  that  the  confirmational  holism claim is  in  fact  dispensable  on  a  certain 
(strong) naturalist reading of premise ii. 
I will examine a recent discussion of the indispensability argument by Mary Leng as an 
example. Leng frames the argument as follows, including a confirmational holism premise:
'P1 (Naturalism): We should look to science, and in particular to the statements that are considered  
best  confirmed  according  to  our  ordinary scientific  standards,  to  discover  what  we  ought  to  
believe.
P2 (Confirmational Holism): The confirmation our theories receive extends to all their statements  
equally.
P3 (Indispensability): Statements whose truth would require the existence of mathematical objects 
are indispensable in formulating our best confirmed scientific theories.
Therefore
C (Mathematical Realism): We ought to believe that there are mathematical objects'.
[Leng 2010: 7].
The  argument  essentially  runs  as  before  with  an  extra  step  emphasised,  holding  that 
statements  quantifying  over  mathematical  objects  are  indispensable  to  our  best  confirmed 
scientific theories, and since we should rationally believe  all statements in our best confirmed 
scientific theories to be true or approximately true, we should rationally believe in the existence of 
mathematical objects.
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Leng argues against P2, noting from Maddy’s work that there are many cases in science 
where scientists do not take confirmation of a theory to apply to all of the theory’s statements – for  
example, when theories involving frictionless planes, continuous fluids or other idealised objects  
are  confirmed,  scientists  do  not  take  the  idealised  objects  to  exist,  although  they  may  be  
indispensable to the theory as useful fictions [Leng 2002: 399, and see Maddy 1992]. Dieveney 
calls  this  type  of  argument,  which  holds  that  our  scientific  theories  can  be  separated  into 
ontologically  committing  and  non-ontologically-committing  parts,  a  separation  objection 
[Dieveney: 113]. 
I will not examine the details of Leng’s separation objection, since my focus here is simply 
on finding out whether the confirmation holism premise is dispensable. 
Even without confirmational holism it seems that the platonist conclusion is justified, since 
the platonist can proceed as follows: our best confirmed scientific statements tell us what we ought 
to believe, that is, we ought to believe our best confirmed scientific statements; our best confirmed  
scientific  statements  include  mathematical  statements  whose  truth  entails  the  existence  of 
mathematical objects; hence we ought to believe some statements whose truth entails the existence 
of mathematical objects; hence we ought to believe there are mathematical objects. Leng's reading 
of the indispensability argument can be reformulated as follows:  
P1 (Naturalism): We should look to science, and in particular to the statements that are considered 
best  confirmed  according  to  our  ordinary scientific  standards,  to  discover  what  we  ought  to  
believe.
P3* (Indispensability): Allusion to mathematical objects is indispensable to some statements which 
are,  or  follow from,  statements considered best  confirmed according to our ordinary scientific 
standards.
Therefore
C (Mathematical Realism): We ought to believe that there are mathematical objects.
This argument does not require the Confirmational Holism premise. At first glance, then, it 
seems that Leng has not successfully undermined the indispensability argument, since the premise 
she argues against is superfluous.
However,  Leng  can  respond  to  this  charge  by  pressing  us  on  the  details  of  our 
understanding of the naturalism premise. Note that we understood the claim that we ‘should look 
to  science  …  to  discover  what  we  ought  to  believe’ as  not  distinguishing  between  parts  of 
15
scientific theories, in order to infer that ‘we ought to believe our scientific statements’ without 
qualification. That is, we seem to have been assuming that ‘it is the truth of all of the utterances 
used to express our best theories … that is confirmed by our successful use of those theories’ 
[Leng 2010: 40]; perhaps we have smuggled confirmational holism into the naturalism premise. In 
this case, the revised argument will still be subject to Leng’s separation objection.
Dieveney notes, however, that 'confirmational holism is not required in order to respond to 
the separation objection' [Dieveney: 125, emphasis  mine]. Rather than relying on confirmational 
holism, the platonist could advance a view that we should look to science as the ultimate arbiter of  
truth and existence, as noted in section 1.1. Leng writes that ‘We trust our best science to tell us  
what we ought to believe that there is, just because that is  all we have to go by’ [Leng 2010: 2, 
italics mine] and claims that 'we ought not to believe in entities beyond those whose existence is 
confirmed according to our best scientific theories' [ibid: 13], which indicates that she accepts a 
strong  reading  of  the  naturalist  premise.  Dieveney  calls  this  reading  of  naturalism theory 
naturalism: ‘We look to our best scientific theories as the ultimate arbiter of existence and truth’ 
[Dieveney: 127]. 
Replacing P1 with the alternative premise of theory naturalism provides the platonist with 
a response to the separation objection, because theory naturalism holds that ‘we have no more  
fundamental means of determining what exists than appealing to our best scientific theories. Given 
that our scientific theories are the ultimate arbiter of what exists, we cannot justifiably distinguish 
within these theories those parts whose ontological commitments we accept and those we do not  
accept’ [Dieveney: 114-5].
Nevertheless,  we can further defend Leng's  separation objection here. Leng's  argument 
against  confirmational  holism  involved  the  claim  that  mathematical  statements  could  be 
representationally useful without being true, in the same way as claims about idealised objects like 
frictionless planes. Perhaps Leng could still claim that we are not ontologically committed to those 
parts of our theories shown to be capable of ‘usefulness without truth’, arguing that this way of  
distinguishing between different parts of our theories takes place within science, or at least within 
the scientific community, because it is the attitude of scientists that tells us we need not take these 
representationally useful posits to exist. 
In  this  sense,  Leng  need  only  rely  on  scientific  practice  to  motivate  her  separation 
objection, without appealing to some more fundamental arbiter than science. Taking this option 
would imply acceptance of some kind of belief naturalism: ‘We look to the beliefs of scientists as a 
source of our ontological commitments’ [Dieveney: 121]. 
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However, the platonist can modify his indispensability claim to hold that statements whose 
truth  would  require  the  existence  of  mathematical  objects  are  indispensable  to  the  beliefs  of 
scientists, in order to formulate their other scientific thoughts. Indeed, many scientists explicitly 
believe that there are mathematical objects. Hence, we are rationally required to believe in the  
existence of mathematical objects, if we take the attitude of scientists as an ontological guide. 
It  will  not  be  possible  to  separate  out  ontologically  committing  beliefs  from  non-
ontologically-committing beliefs, not because some version of confirmational holism requires us to 
accept all beliefs held by scientists, but because neither science nor the beliefs themselves can tell  
us which beliefs are ontologically privileged. Attempts at a separation objection thus falter here,  
with no appeal to confirmational holism required on the platonist's behalf.
Of  course,  adapting  the  naturalist  premise  in  this  manner  in  order  to  do  without 
confirmational holism may make that premise much less plausible. For example, belief naturalism 
seems quite unconvincing,  since there are various cases where the beliefs of  scientists  do not  
converge  even  where  physical  entities  are  concerned,  as  evidenced  by  conflicting  opinions  
amongst scientists on the ontological status of atoms before Perrin’s experiments [Dieveney: 119].  
Similarly, theory naturalism, which takes science to be our ultimate arbiter of existence and truth, 
is itself controversial. 
The point reached in this section is simply that there are versions of the indispensability 
argument that do not rely on confirmational holism. In the next section, I will  present a more 
plausible indispensability argument of this kind.
1.4: An explanatory indispensability argument
We saw in the last section that the confirmational holism premise sometimes held to be implicit in 
the indispensability argument is superfluous, since a premise of theory naturalism is sufficient to  
entail the desired platonist conclusion as well as to respond to separation objections.
However, theory naturalism is a strong reading of the original naturalist premise in section 
1.1, which claimed merely that we should believe in our best scientific theories. That is, we have 
dispensed with the confirmational holism premise at the cost of committing to a view of science as 
our ultimate arbiter of truth and existence, which may not be convincing to all anti-platonists (or  
indeed platonists) and is easier to undermine than a weaker reading of mere ‘healthy respect’ for 
science.  Remember that my aim was to find a form of the indispensability argument with the  
fewest and least controversial premises. Ideally, then, there would be a way of responding to the 
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separation  objection  using  a  less  contentious  premise  than  either  theory  naturalism  or 
confirmational holism.
Fortunately,  such  a  form of  the  indispensability argument  has  recently been  given  by 
platonists in response to objections to the original  argument.  The idea of this  revised form of  
indispensability argument is to focus on the theoretical contribution mathematics makes to science  
beyond representational usefulness, in particular its explanatory role. The revised argument runs as 
follows:
(1) 'We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity that plays an indispensable 
explanatory role in our best scientific theories.
(2) Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science.
(3) Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathematical objects'.
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument, in [Baker 2009: 613].
A separation objection cannot readily be used here to deny the conclusion of the argument, because 
the argument itself has separated our scientific theories into explanatory and non-explanatory parts  
and  taken  mathematical  statements  to  fall  into  the  former  category,  arguing  that  they  must  
therefore be true. 
Neither side in the debate has provided a comprehensive account of what it means for 
objects to play an explanatory role; as we will see in chapter 4, both sides in the debate tend to  
place the burden of providing such an account on their opponent. On the platonist's behalf, note  
that  singling  out  the  genuinely  explanatory  parts  of  a  theory  and  showing  that  they  can  be 
formulated without quantifying over mathematical objects may plausibly be as difficult for the 
nominalist  as  Field’s  approach.  Furthermore,  platonists  have  provided  examples  where  it  is 
claimed that mathematical entities do play a genuinely explanatory and indispensable role. I will 
examine these issues in later chapters, focusing on Baker's cicadas example from [Baker 2005,  
2009] in chapter 3.
In this chapter, my focus is on finding a strong version of the indispensability argument, 
which is not easily undermined.
Therefore, I take it that a less controversial claim will be preferable. For example, consider 
the premise:
(1*) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of objects that feature indispensably in our best  
scientific explanations.
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The notion of ‘featuring in an explanation’ here can be taken very broadly to mean that the 
explanation alludes to mathematical objects. With a literal reading of truth in the background, we 
can see that (1*) is implied by:
(1**) We ought rationally to believe in the truth of our best scientific explanations.
But this is just an endorsement of inference to the best explanation (IBE) in a scientific context. As 
Busch notes, the entire argument can be recast in this form6 [Busch 2011a]:
(1**) We ought rationally to believe in the truth of our best scientific explanations;
(2*) Allusion to mathematical objects is indispensable to our best scientific explanations;
(3) Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathematical objects.
I  will  focus  on  this  version  of  the  argument  over  Baker's,  because  it  involves  an 
endorsement of IBE rather than Baker's claim that we should believe in the existence of entities  
which play an explanatory role. As we will  see in chapter 4, Baker's  claim reads as a further  
condition on IBE and is thus more vulnerable to attack. 
For now, note that Baker claims that ‘the indispensability debate only gets off the ground if  
both sides take IBE seriously’ [Baker 2005: 225], and according to Pincock, 'All sides start from 
the  position  of  some  form of  scientific  realism that  accepts  at  least  some  instances  of  IBE'  
[Pincock:  211].  This  suggests  that  the  implicit  endorsement  of  IBE  in  my  version  of  the  
explanatory indispensability  argument makes that argument quite difficult  for the nominalist to 
undermine. For this reason, and because my version of the explanatory indispensability argument  
does not appeal to confirmational holism or a strong understanding of naturalism, I will take this  
version of the explanatory indispensability argument as my target in the rest of the thesis.  In the 
next section, I will say a little more about its premises.
1.5: Two new premises
1.5.1: Dispensability again
It may seem as though the revised indispensability premise of the explanatory indispensability 
argument provided in the previous section  can be weakened; perhaps it is sufficient for premise 
(2*)  to  read  simply 'Mathematical  objects  feature  in  our  best  scientific  explanations'.  This  is  
because, if there were two equally good explanations (by some measure of explanatory virtue), 
6 Thanks also to Mark Kalderon for this point.
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where  one  posited  mathematical  objects  and  one  did  not,  then  the  explanation  with  fewer 
ontological  commitments  would  be  preferable.  So  if  mathematical  objects  feature  in  our  best 
scientific  explanations,  this  means  that  an  alternative  explanation  not  positing  mathematical 
objects  must  already be  a  worse  explanation  by our  definition  of  explanatory virtue;  that  is, 
indispensability does no work [Busch 2011a: 154].
However, this is to equivocate about 'best'  on two different conceptions of explanatory 
virtue, one including and one not including ontological considerations. Recall our understanding of 
indispensability from sections 1.1 and 1.2. Allusion to mathematical objects is indispensable to a 
theory,  T,  iff  T is  scientifically better  than  any rival  theory without  allusion  to  mathematical 
objects. Adapting this definition for explanations, if allusion to mathematical objects is dispensable 
to  a  scientific  explanation,  then  there  is  a  rival  explanation without  allusion  to  mathematical 
objects which is equally good or better on a particular reading of explanatory virtue. We took the 
original explanation to be our best, so this rival explanation must be equally good rather than better  
on the reading of explanatory virtue selected. But premise (1**) tells us simply to believe the best 
explanation, and since both rival explanations are equally good, does not tell us to select the one 
featuring  mathematical  objects,  as  required  for  the  argument  to  go  through.  Thus  the 
indispensability premise cannot be weakened, on my reading of indispensability.
1.5.2: Inference to the best explanation
As I noted in section 1.4, premise (1**) of the explanatory indispensability argument reads as an 
endorsement  of  inference  to  the  best  explanation  in  a  scientific  context.  At  first  sight,  this 
endorsement seems to be granted by both sides in the debate: indeed, Baker claims that there is  
already an 'implicit endorsement of scientific realism by both the platonist and nominalist sides in 
the indispensability debate. A crucial plank of the scientific realist position involves inference to 
the best explanation (IBE) to justify the postulation in particular cases of unobservable theoretical 
entities’ [Baker 2005: 225].
I  will  say  more  about  the  way  inference  to  the  best  explanation  is  involved  in  the  
explanatory indispensability argument, and about the way scientific realism is connected to the  
debate, in chapter 2. For now, note that the fact that both sides in the indispensability debate are 
taken to accept inference to the best explanation in a scientific context suggests that premise (1**) 
is relatively uncontroversial, as desired.
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Conclusion
I have examined various forms of the indispensability argument and found that the explanatory 
indispensability argument has the least controversial premises, appealing neither to confirmational  
holism  nor  to  a  strong  naturalism.  I  have  argued  that  the  indispensability  premise  in  the 
explanatory indispensability argument cannot be weakened, and noted that the IBE premise is, at 
least  at  first  sight,  granted  by  both  sides  in  the  debate. In  this  sense,  the  explanatory 
indispensability  argument  can  be  seen  as  a  particularly  strong  form  of  the  indispensability 
argument, and it is also a version currently under discussion in the literature. Therefore, I will take  
the explanatory indispensability argument as my target in the rest of this thesis. In the next chapter, 
I will examine the role played by IBE in the explanatory indispensability argument in more detail.
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Chapter  2:  How  is  inference  to  the  best  explanation  involved  in  the  explanatory 
indispensability argument?
Introduction
In chapter 1, I formulated the explanatory indispensability argument as follows:
1) We ought rationally to believe in the truth of our best scientific explanations.
2) Allusion to mathematical objects is indispensable to our best scientific explanations.
3) Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathematical objects.
I  claimed  that  premise  1  should  be  read  as  an  endorsement  of  inference  to  the  best 
explanation,  or  IBE,  in  a  scientific  context.  This  appeal  to  IBE is  taken  to  be  central  to  the  
indispensability  debate.  For  example,  Baker  claims  that  the  idea  behind  the  explanatory 
indispensability argument, ‘shared by both sides in the above debate, is that … it restricts attention 
to cases where we can posit the existence of a given entity by inference to the best explanation’ 
[Baker 2009: 613]. Furthermore, ‘the indispensability debate only gets off the ground if both sides 
take  IBE seriously’,  according  to  Baker  [Baker  2005:  225].  In  order  to  fully  understand  the  
indispensability debate, therefore, it will be necessary to examine in more detail the role played by 
IBE in the explanatory indispensability argument. That will be the focus of this chapter.
First, I will  need to provide some background for inference to the best explanation. In 
section 2.1, I lay out the basic structure of an inference to the best explanation, formulating various 
conditions that must be fulfilled for such an inference to be acceptable. In section 2.2, I examine  
the use of IBE in a well-known argument for scientific realism, the ‘No Miracles’ argument. As 
well as providing an example of IBE in application, section 2.2 is also important because of a link 
commonly drawn between scientific realism, IBE and mathematical realism by platonists.
In section 2.3, I examine the endorsement of inference to the best explanation that I claim 
is implicit in premise 1) above. Examining the literature in order to elaborate on this claim, I will 
provide two readings of the explanatory indispensability argument, connecting the argument to 
scientific realism and directly to IBE, respectively.  I will  argue that the second reading of the  
explanatory indispensability argument is the most plausible.
After examining the explanatory indispensability argument in more detail and clarifying its 
connection  to  inference  to  the  best  explanation,  I  will  examine  the  options  available  to  the 
nominalist in trying to undermine the argument. These fall into four categories. I will discuss each  
of these briefly in section 2.4 and select the two most promising strategies to be examined in 
chapters 3 and 4.
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